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1. INTRODUCTION
The CANDU 6 Pressurized Heavy Water reactor core
consists of 380 horizontal fuel channels submerged in a
large volume (~215,000 L) of subcooled heavy water mod-
erator in a cylindrical calandria vessel [1]. The heavy-water
moderator also provides a secondary heat sink function.
The calandria vessel is surrounded by a calandria vault
with a large volume (~514,000 L) of light water. Each fuel
channel consists of a Zr-2.5wt%Nb pressure tube concen-
trically located within a Zircaloy-2 calandria tube. Within
each pressure tube there are twelve 0.5-m long fuel bundles,
each consisting of Zr-4 clad fuel elements containing UO2
pellets. The fission and decay thermal energy produced in
the UO2 fuel pellets is removed by heavy water coolant - the
primary heat-transport fluid - circulating at about 10 MPa
and 300°C under normal operating conditions (NOC). The
coolant flow is forced through the pressure tubes by the
primary heat transport system (PHTS) pumps via the inlet
and outlet feeder pipes connecting the respective inlet and
outlet headers. At NOC, the total heat generation in the fuel,
coolant and pressure tubes is 2061 MW, with an additional
95 MW (neutron moderation plus gamma heat) generated
in the moderator and other core components (e.g., calandria
tubes, guide tubes, tube sheets). The total core fission and
decay heat, at NOC, is 2156 MW.
There are two independent control systems and two
independent shutdown systems to shut the reactor in any
design basis or severe-accident emergencies. For accidents
with the reactor coolant pressure boundary intact, the decay
heat is removed by the steam generator heat sink or a ded-
icated decay heat removal system. For loss-of-coolant
accidents, the decay heat is removed by the Emergency
Core Cooling System. For beyond design basis accidents
the plants have adequate heat sink provisions to mitigate the
accidents. These systems operate independent of external
sources of electricity or other resources. In the Enhanced
CANDU reactor, a severe accident recovery and heat re-
moval system (SARHRS) has been incorporated to provide
water makeup to:
• Steam generators to prolong the secondary-side heat
sink;
• The calandria vessel and/or the calandria vault;
• The containment spray to suppress containment
pressure; and
• Refill the reserve water tank (RWT) for severe accident
management needs.
In a pressurized heavy water reactor, following loss of the primary coolant, severe core damage would begin with the
depletion of the liquid moderator, exposing the top row of internally-voided fuel channels to steam cooling conditions on the
inside and outside. The uncovered fuel channels would heat up, deform and disassemble into core debris. Large inventories of
water passively reduce the rate of progression of the accident, prolonging the time for complete loss of engineered heat sinks.
The efficacy of available backup and ultimate heat sinks, available in a CANDU 6 reactor, in mitigating the consequences
of a prolonged station blackout scenario was analysed using the MAAP4-CANDU code. The analysis indicated that the steam
generator secondary side water inventory is the most effective heat sink during the accident. Additional heat sinks such as the
primary coolant, moderator, calandria vault water and end shield water are also able to remove decay heat; however, a
gradually increasing mismatch between heat generation and heat removal occurs over the course of the postulated event. This
mismatch is equivalent to an additional water inventory estimated to be 350,000 kg at the time of calandria vessel failure. In
the Enhanced CANDU 6 reactor ~2,040,000 kg of water in the reserve water tank is available for prolonged emergencies
requiring heat sinks.
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Even in the unlikely failure of the decay heat removal
systems, the moderator system will prevent gross damage
to the fuel and maintain fuel channel integrity. In the unlikely
event that the moderator cooling also fails, the fuel channels
would sag, disassemble and collapse as the moderator boils
off; however, the core debris would still be contained within
the calandria vessel as long as the vessel remains cooled on
the outside by the calandria vault water. Only if sufficient
calandria vault water boils off would the calandria vessel
fail; this would take a long time, typically around 40 hours.
This long delay in the failure of the calandria vessel provides
time to implement Severe Accident Management procedures
to arrest the progression of the accident.
For a pressurized heavy water reactor, accidents that
result in damage to the reactor core fall into two classes:
those for which the core geometry is generally preserved
(limited core damage accidents) and those for which the
core geometry is lost (severe core damage accidents). The
latter are severe accidents, whereas limited core damage
accidents are typically considered as part of the design
basis. As such, there are provisions for the prevention and
mitigation of limited core damage accidents before severe
accident management is required.
An ultimate heat sink is an environment capable of
absorbing heat from a nuclear power plant without an ap-
preciable change in the heat sink temperature. Typically
CANDU reactors use lake or sea water as the ultimate heat
sink. Thus an unlimited supply of water is available to
cool vital systems and the primary containment during any
accident.
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview
of heat sinks available in a CANDU reactor. A station
blackout case was analysed using the MAAP4-CANDU
code to gain insight into the maximum heat load during
the event and the effect on the heat sinks.
2. ANALYSIS OF A STATION BLACKOUT IN A
CANDU POWER PLANT
The assessment of backup and ultimate heat sinks was
performed for a station blackout scenario, a transient initi-
ated by losing off-site AC (Class IV) power with a subse-
quent loss of all on-site standby (Class III) and emergency
electric power supplies. The analysis assumptions are
provided in Table 1; none of the active heat sinks were used
in the simulation. The decay heat removal was by passive
heat sinks: the water inventories of the PHTS, moderator,
steam generator secondary side, end shields and calandria
vault. The analysis examined the efficacy of the passive
heat sinks in a CANDU 6 reactor to remove the decay
heat, and provided an understanding of the necessity of
securing long-term heat sinks against prolonged station
blackout.
The analysis presented in this paper uses generic
CANDU 6 input parameters. The station blackout sequence
and its progression are heavily dependent on the specific
station conditions and may vary from the generic input
used in this analysis. Therefore, the inferences made from
this analysis are mainly indicative of the behaviour based
on the input and boundary conditions applied.
2.1 Features of MAAP4-CANDU
Version v4.0.5A+ of the MAAP4-CANDU code was
executed on a PC Pentium IV 1700 MHz computer. MAAP
(Modular Accident Analysis Program) is an integral nuclear
plant analysis code for modelling severe core damage
accidents [2]. The MAAP code was developed for pres-
surized and boiling light water reactors by Fauske and
Associates Incorporated, and is owned by the Electric
Power Research Institute. The MAAP4-CANDU Channels
System, developed by Ontario Power Generation, is the
portion of MAAP4-CANDU that models the thermal-
hydraulic, thermal-chemical, and thermal-mechanical
behaviour of the CANDU horizontal channels as they
heat up and disassemble into debris. The CANDU core is
different from that of PWRs and BWRs. The disassembly
of the horizontal channels and core relocation during a
severe accident is more complex. Several phenomenological
models [3], [4] and [5] specific to the CANDU core have
been implemented by best-estimate calculations. The
MAAP4-CANDU Channels System is computationally
intensive. A modular code structure was used to decouple the
MAAP4-CANDU Channels System from other MAAP4-
CANDU components and from MAAP4 generic routines,
to allow better code maintainability, model improvements,
and adjustments to other CANDU reactor configurations.
Code improvements are thus performed in a more secure
and independent manner.
The MAAP4-CANDU Channels System models char-
acteristic (or representative) fuel channels and their contents
after the channels are dry (i.e., empty of water) and during
the channel heat up and subsequent processes (e.g., Zr-
steam reaction, channel disassembly, suspended debris
behaviour). Each characteristic channel represents a larger
number of associated channels with similar power, eleva-
tions within the core, and feeder geometries. The core
heat-up processes are modelled in a given characteristic
channel only after the channel is deemed dry (i.e., when
the water remaining in the channel, attached feeders and
end fittings is less than a user input value, typically 1 kg).
The Channels System also models the disassembly of the
fuel and fuel channel into suspended debris. The processes
after the debris (solid and molten) has moved to the terminal
debris bed (i.e., the bottom of the calandria vessel) are
modelled by a different portion of the MAAP4-CANDU
code. Further details of the code and nodalization schemes
are provided in [6] and [7].
The MAAP4-CANDU code uses three files containing
input data: the parameter file, the input file and the channel
data file. The parameter file for the generic CANDU 6
station consists of ~5,000 parameters, providing information
590 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
NITHEANANDAN et al., Backup and Ultimate Heat Sinks in CANDU Reactors for Prolonged SBO Accidents
591NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
NITHEANANDAN et al., Backup and Ultimate Heat Sinks in CANDU Reactors for Prolonged SBO Accidents
on component geometries, model control and initial reactor
parameters: pressures, temperatures, equipment volumes,
water inventories, etc. The input file contains characteristics
of the accident sequence to be analysed, such as a station
blackout. The channel data file contains fuel and fuel channel
temperatures and Zr oxide thicknesses, used as initial
conditions when a channel becomes dry on the inside and
the fuel and fuel channel heat transfer calculations begin.
The integrated response of the entire reactor and con-
tainment during the initiating stages of an accident and the
subsequent severe accident events (e.g., core disassembly,
calandria vessel failure) is simulated by the code. In this
analysis the station blackout sequence was run to 500,000 s
(~139 h or 5.8 days). The code execution time was ~30 min.
Table 2 lists the sequence of significant events simulated
during this code run.
2.2 Station Blackout Event Sequence
The accident sequence begins with the initiating event
(time = 0 s); the loss of Class IV and Class III power causes
the loss of motive power to pumps in the PHTS, moderator
cooling, end shield and calandria vault cooling, steam gen-
erator feedwater, and recirculating cooling water systems.
The accident progresses to severe core damage and core
disassembly, because of the loss of the PHTS inventory,
long-term emergency core cooling, moderator cooling,
and shield and calandria vault cooling. 
With the loss of Class IV and III power the reactor
trips immediately (shut off rods are held out of core by
electromagnets), and the pumps run down, ending the
active heat sink capability. The steam generator secondary
side water boils off (Fig. 1) and vents to the atmosphere,
removing core decay heat for approximately 1.9 h and
Table 1. Summary of SBO Simulation Assumptions for the MAAP4 CANDU
System
Core initial power
Class IV power
Class III power
Reactor shutdown
PHTS loop isolation
Emergency Power Supply
D2O supply system
D2O recovery system 
Turbine generator stop valve closure
Main feedwater
Aux feedwater 
Emergency water supply system
Main Steam Safety Valves (pneumatic actuation)
Crash cool-down 
Moderator cooling
Shield cooling
High Pressure Emergency Core Coolant
Medium Pressure Emergency Core Coolant
Low Pressure Emergency Core Coolant
Dousing spray
Local Air Coolers
Calandria Vessel relief/bleed valve
H2 recombiners
H2 igniters
Containment leakage
Case SBO
100% full power 2155.9 MW (incl. gamma heat generated in moderator)
Not available
Not available
Available 
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Available
Not available
Assumed to fail open after 2 hr due to depletion of instrument air
Available
Not available
2.5% volume per 24 hrs at 124 kPa(g)
depressurizing the PHTS to ~9 MPa (Fig. 2). With the loss
of decay heat removal by the steam generator secondary
side, the primary coolant heats up and repressurizes. The
PHTS liquid relief valves (LRV) open and close, venting
primary coolant into the degasser condenser (Fig. 2). The
degasser condenser pressurizes and vents to the containment
and the containment pressurization initiates dousing. The
fuel is uncovered and heats up as the PHTS inventory
decreases (Fig. 3). The dry fuel channels overheat and one
or two rupture, depressurizing the PHTS. 
Moderator from the calandria vessel is partially expelled
when a fuel channel ruptures and pressurizes the calandria
vessel, bursting the rupture disks in the calandria vessel
relief ducts (Fig. 4). The top fuel channels are uncovered
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Time (hr)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.4
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.2
2.5
N/A
3.9
4.0
3.9
4.0
4.0
4.3
5.5
5.5
N/A
N/A
8.1
8.1
11
14
46
46
53
56
120
Time (s)
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,603
6,636
6,688
6,693
7,178
7,840
8,802
N/A
14,084
14,248
14,288
14,494
14,531
15,580
19,669
19,681
N/A
N/A
29,207
29,242
39,005
49,854
166,187
166,188
190,530
200,371
431,600
Event
AC power loss (Class IV & III)
Turbine stop valves closed (MAAP4-CANDU does not model them open).
Moderator cooling and circulation off, primary pumps off
Shield cooling system off
Steam Generator main and auxiliary feed water pumps off
Reactor trip due to loss of power.
Calandria vessel bleed valve opens
LRVs open for the first time, PHTS Loops 1 & 2
Steam Generator secondary sides are dry, Loop 2
Steam Generator secondary sides are dry, Loop 1
Dousing system starts
Dousing system exhausted (dousing max flow rate is 2142 kg/s)
Pressurizer empty
Crash cool-down system start (crash cool-down unavailable)
At least one channel is dry Loop 2 (complete boil-off) – Channel 1
At least one channel is dry Loop 1 (complete boil-off) – Channel 1
Pressure and calandria tubes are ruptured Loop 2 – Channel 7
Moderator reaches saturation temperature
Calandria vessel rupture disk open, connecting to steam generator room
Calandria vault rupture disk open, connecting to steam generator room
Beginning of the core disassembly, Loop 2
Beginning of the core disassembly, Loop 1
Loop 2 massive core debris relocation (core dump) to calandria vessel bottom
Loop 1 massive core debris relocation (core dump) to calandria vessel bottom
Large airlock seals failed (Junction 30) = Containment failed
Small airlock seals failed (Junction 31)
Water is depleted inside calandria vessel 
Water in calandria vault reaches saturation temperature
Calandria vessel failed
Energetic core-debris steam interaction occurred in calandria vault
Water is depleted inside calandria vault (Node 10)
Molten corium-concrete interaction begins in calandria vault
Calandria vault floor failed because of concrete ablation
Table 2. Sequence of Significant Events for a CANDU 6 Station Blackout
by the loss of moderator. Because these fuel channels are no
longer cooled inside or out, they overheat, disassemble and
sag onto lower intact channels still cooled by the remaining
moderator. Some debris relocates to the bottom of calandria
vessel, where it is quenched by the remaining moderator.
The hot suspended debris and sagged channels can exceed
the load supportable by the cool intact channels, at which
time the majority of core drops to bottom of calandria vessel
in a rapid core collapse. In the current simulation, the sus-
pended debris never exceeded the criterion for core collapse,
so the debris relocation to the bottom of the calandria vessel
occurred more slowly, without a sudden core collapse.
The moderator boils off due to the decay heat from
the debris (corium) at the bottom of the calandria vessel
(Fig. 4). The calandria vault water cools the external surface
of the calandria vessel, which in turn cools the core debris
even after the moderator has boiled off. The corium decay
heat boils off the calandria vault water (Fig. 5). As the
calandria vault water level decreases, more of the calandria
vessel is uncovered and heats up due to convection and
radiation heat transfer from the corium. The calandria
vessel is assumed to fail when the calandria vault water
level decreases below the elevation of the top of the debris
in the calandria vessel. The core debris then relocates onto
the calandria vault floor. The remaining vault water boils
off, leading to molten core concrete interaction and the
eventual melt-through of the calandria vault floor. The molten
corium relocates to the reactor building basement, where it
is quenched by the water that drained there from contain-
ment (i.e., PHTS water lost through the LRVs, moderator
lost through the relief ducts, plus steam that condensed on
containment heat sinks). Additional events are listed Table 2.
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Fig. 1. The Water Level in the Steam Generators in a Generic
CANDU 6 Reactor Following a Postulated Station Blackout Event
Fig. 2. The Primary Heat Transport System Pressure in a
Generic CANDU 6 Reactor Following a Postulated Station
Blackout Event
Fig. 3. The Primary Heat Transport System Coolant Inventory
in a Generic CANDU 6 Reactor Following a Postulated
Station Blackout Event
Fig. 5. The Water Level in the Calandria Vault and End
Shields in a Generic CANDU 6 Reactor Following a
Postulated Station Blackout Event
Fig. 4. The Moderator Mass Inside the Calandria Vessel in a
Generic CANDU 6 Reactor Following a Postulated Station
Blackout Event
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3. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HEAT SINKS IN
CANDU REACTORS FOR PROLONGED STATION
BLACKOUT ACCIDENTS
CANDU reactors have a distinct advantage over other
reactor designs with respect to multiple water reservoirs,
already in place, that act as heat sinks during prolonged
station blackouts until external water supplies can be estab-
lished. These water sources, in the order of their depletion
during a station blackout sequence, are the: (a) light water
inventory in the secondary side of the steam generators, (b)
heavy water primary coolant, (c) heavy water inventory in
the emergency core cooling system, (d) heavy water mod-
erator in the calandria vessel, and (e) light water inventory
in the calandria vault and end shields. The total amount of
water in these reservoirs is approximately 1,283 tonnes.
The provision of these intermediate alternate heat sinks
in CANDU reactors makes the uncertainties in severe
core damage behaviour inherently less important while
the progression of accident is relatively slow.
During a station blackout sequence the first heat sink
available to cool the fuel is the volume of water in the PHTS.
The PHTS ability to cool the fuel, however, is coupled to
the availability of water in the steam generators; as long
as the steam generator secondary side is maintained with
an adequate inventory of water, the primary heat transport
fluid effectively transfers the decay heat to the steam gen-
erators. The heat transport system pumps run down and
provide forced circulation through the PHTS for the first
few (high power) seconds. The decay heat in the channels
and the cooling in the steam generators produce a density
difference in the primary heat transport fluid, which induces
natural circulation. This circulation removes the decay heat
from the core to the steam generators. Natural circulation
in the PHTS has been confirmed to be an effective heat
removal mechanism in pressurized heavy water reactors [8].
In the steam generators, the secondary side water boils
and the steam (and heat) is discharged to the atmosphere
via spring-loaded main steam safety valves. Figs. 1 and 2
show that for about 1.9 h, the steam generator secondary
side inventory boils off, effectively removing the decay
heat from the fuel and depressurizing the PHTS to approxi-
mately 9 MPa.
Fig. 6 shows a comparison between integrated decay
heat and the heat removal capacity of various heat sinks
available in CANDU reactors. The integrated heat is a
convenient way to illustrate how the heat input and output
behave when only the passive heat sinks within the reactor
are available. Ideally, the integrated fission product decay
heat curve (solid black line) should coincide (or be lower
than) the total heat removed by the heat sinks (dashed blue
line) during a severe accident. All of the decay heat will
not be in the fuel, because fuel sheath failures and fuel
heat up will release some fission products into the PHTS,
to be subsequently transported into the calandria vessel
and then the containment; however, even with additional
fission product releases from hot debris in the calandria
vessel, the majority of the decay heat continues to be
generated in the corium, wherever it is located.
The dashed lines in Fig. 6 show the heat that is removed
by the water and (mainly) steam that are expelled from
various systems through the PHTS LRVs, calandria vessel
relief ducts and relief valves, calandria vault relief duct,
and steam generator relief valves. The heat removed by
the steam generators (red-dashed line) is calculated by
MAAP4-CANDU and then integrated using an Excel
spreadsheet. The other three dashed lines (the calandria
vessel, calandria vault + end shields, and the PHTS fluid)
are estimates using the MAAP-CANDU calculations of
the specific heat and mass flow rates of steam and water
crossing a boundary. The heavy blue dashed line is the sum
of the four light dashed lines described above (i.e., the sum
of heat removed by the sensible heat of water and the latent
heat in generating steam). The heat absorbed by large water
masses as sensible heat in the calandria vessel and reactor
vault will not appear in these calculations because the control
volume boundary used for the calculations is the calandria
vault surface.
Fig. 6 shows that, until the steam generators dry out, the
decay heat is completely removed from within containment,
except for a small loss through the primary heat transport
piping to containment and a small amount to the end shields
and moderator. The steam generators initially remove more
than the decay heat, making the primary coolant subcooled
and thus depressurizing the PHTS to ~9 MPa (Fig. 2). As
illustrated by this analysis, the most effective heat removal
strategy that could mitigate the consequences of a station
blackout would be to establish adequate water make up to
the steam generators and ensure that they do not dry out.
The steam generator secondary side boils dry at 1.9 h,
ending the heat sink for the PHTS. The PHTS pressure
increases from ~9 MPa to 10.16 MPa by 1.8 h (Fig. 2) and
the coolant mass begins to decrease (Fig. 3) as the LRVs
open and close, discharging two-phase primary heat trans-
port fluid to containment and preventing the pressure from
Fig. 6. The Integrated Decay Heat and the Integrated Passive
Heat Sink Capacity from Water Inventories Available in a
CANDU Reactor
rising further. As a result, the primary coolant inventory
decreases more rapidly as coolant is discharged (Fig. 3). As
the water inventories decrease, fuel begins to be exposed
and begins to heat up. The fuel channel ruptures, due to
high PHTS pressure coincident with high fuel channel
temperatures. The PHTS rapidly depressurizes (Fig. 2) due
to the channel rupture and the water mass in the PHTS
decreases further to less than 2,000 kg/loop (Fig. 3). Fig. 7
shows the water mass available as heat sinks are depleted
during the accident progression in comparison with the
total decay heat generated.
The mismatch between the integrated decay heat gen-
eration and the integrated total heat removal (Fig. 6) occurs
after the steam generators dry out. This mismatch causes the
integrated total heat removal curve to be approximately
1.4 x 105 MJ less than the integrated decay heat, by the
time the channel ruptures. The total heat removal curve
then runs in parallel with the decay heat curve, since the
moderator boil off matches the decay heat generation until
the moderator is depleted at 11 h. Since the decay heat is
not being absorbed by other heat sinks during this time
(i.e., debris heat up), it indicates that the decay heat in the
calandria vessel is less than the total decay heat curve,
probably because of heat storage in the form of sensible
heat up to the saturation point in the moderator and some
fission products transported out into the containment. As
can be seen in Fig. 6, restoring a heat sink capability with
additional water (e.g., steam generator makeup prior to loss
of primary coolant, calandria vessel refill after channel
rupture) could increase the total rate of heat removal so
that the heat removal curve would again coincide with
the integrated decay heat generation (or be maintained in
parallel). In the Enhanced CANDU reactors provisions
are made available, through the severe accident recovery
and heat removal system, to supply makeup water during
emergencies.
During the early stages of the accident progression,
the moderator slowly heats up because of the loss of the
moderator cooling system and the addition of heat from
the fuel channels (conducted across the gas-filled fuel
channel annulus). As the moderator is heated, the thermal
expansion increases the pressure difference between the
calandria vessel and containment, causing the moderator
bleed valves to open and close. Fig. 4 shows the moderator
mass. The channel rupture pressurizes the calandria vessel
until the calandria vessel rupture disks in the relief ducts
burst at 4 h. The calandria vessel pressure decreases to the
moderator saturation pressure, so the moderator begins to
boil vigorously; the turbulent boiling generates a large
amount of two-phase fluid that is expelled out of the relief
ducts. The result is that approximately 70,000 kg of mod-
erator (i.e., water) is ejected out the calandria vessel along
with the steam (Fig. 4). The loss of moderator by this route
decreases the volume of the heat sink available for fuel
cooling; however, the remaining moderator inventory boils
off over a period of several hours (11 h), successfully
maintaining the debris in a cooled state.
Following the calandria vessel dry out, the total heat
removed (Fig. 6) remains constant at ~7.5 x 105 MJ for
approximately 3 h, until the calandria vault water becomes
saturated and steam starts leaving the calandria vault. The
large volume of water in the calandria vault can absorb
approximately 2.15 GJ of heat (4.186 kJ/kg x 514,000 kg)
for every degree of temperature rise. The decay heat is
~15.5 MW at the time, and some decay heat is used by the
corium heat up and melting, so the calandria vault water
heats at less than 1°C per 140 s. Thus it takes ~3 h after
moderator boil off for the vault water to reach the saturation
temperature at ~14 h.
After the calandria vault water reaches saturation, the
total heat removal rate increases again, however, the slope
of the curve is still less than the integrated decay heat curve
(Fig. 6). This indicates progressively distressed cooling
and corium temperature escalation, although it must be
recalled that the integrated decay heat curve represents all
the decay heat, including the decay heat deposited in con-
tainment by fission products transported out of the calandria
vessel. The water inventory in the calandria vault boils for
about 32 h until the calandria vessel fails at 46 h. Until this
time, the core is maintained in-vessel, although the top of
the calandria vessel becomes uncovered at 29 h, and the
vessel is progressively uncovered. This reduces the size
of the heat sink seen by the top of the corium, as well as
allowing the uncovered portions of the calandria vessel
to heat up.
After the calandria vessel fails at 46 h, the corium is
assumed to pour into the calandria vault, where it is quenched
by the remaining water. Molten corium-concrete interaction
begins at 56 h, after the remaining calandria vault water has
boiled off.
The slow progression of the station blackout sequence
described above provides sufficient time for operator action
to add water into the reactor (calandria vessel or calandria
vault). As shown in Fig. 6, at the time of calandria vessel
failure, the total heat removed is approximately 0.8 x 106 MJ
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Fig. 7. The Total Water Mass Available as Heat Sinks in a
CANDU Reactor during Station Blackout Sequence in
Comparison with the Total Decay Heat
below the integrated decay curve. This is equivalent to
about 350,000 kg of water evaporating at atmospheric
pressure (hfg = 2260 kJ/kg). If 350 tonnes of water was
available at this late stage of the accident, it would be
sufficient to (almost) refill the calandria vault, and thus
delay the calandria vessel failure by over 30 hours (recalling
that the decay heat is declining continuously). Of course
the reactor would still be damaged, with a large debris bed
in the bottom of the calandria vessel. If 350 tonnes of water
were available at the beginning of the accident, it could
delay steam generator dry out to ~14 hours from 1.9 h
(including the effect of declining decay heat), providing
much needed time to re-establish alternative power sources
to restore cooling, and prevent reactor damage. In the current
CANDU 6 reactors severe accident management measures
ensure that additional water is made available for core
cooling during emergencies. In the Enhanced CANDU 6 the
reserve water tank has a capacity of ~2,040,000 kg, which
can easily restore cooling to the steam generators, PHTS,
calandria vessel and calandria vault.
At present, lake or sea water is the ultimate heat sink for
heat from the turbine condensers and moderator cooling
systems during NOC, while four types of alternate back up
heat sinks exist within the containment for emergencies.
The backup heat sinks can remove heat from the reactor core
to the atmosphere (steam generators) or into the containment
(all other heat sinks). The reserve water tank can provide
an additional supply of water without requiring pumps. The
water expelled from the PHTS LRVs and the calandria
vessel, plus condensate from containment, can act as a
temporary heat sink provided the water can be pumped
back into required systems.
Thus in a CANDU reactor, a large inventory of water
and multiple barriers have the inherent capability to prevent
(or slow) corium debris falling onto the concrete floor
leading to core-concrete interaction, during a severe accident.
The slow progression of the accident provides adequate
time for the operator to restore heat sinks and ensure fuel
or debris cooling.
4. SUMMARY
For a pressurized heavy water reactor, core damage
accidents are grouped into two broad categories: limited
core damage accidents and severe core damage accidents.
The limited core damage accidents are typically considered
as part of the design basis whereas the severe core damage
accidents are considered beyond design basis accidents.
A station blackout case was analysed for a generic
CANDU 6, using the MAAP4-CANDU computer code.
Analysis indicated that the steam generators can remove
the decay heat effectively for about 1.9 h, by boiling off
water in the secondary side. When the steam generator
secondary side dries out, a mismatch between heat genera-
tion and heat removal begins. The remaining heat sinks
continue to boil off and remove heat at a rate lower than
the decay heat generation, until the moderator in the calandria
vessel is depleted at 11 h. The rate of heat generation and
heat removed gradually diverge after 14 h. The last of the
water inventories in the calandria vault begins to boil off
at 14 h and the calandria vault water delays calandria vessel
failure until 46 h. The difference between the heat removed
by boiling off water inventories, and the integrated decay
heat, is equivalent to the latent heat of ~350 tonnes of water,
at the time of the calandria vessel failure. If this water is
available at any stage of the accident to that point, it would
significantly delay the accident progression, providing
operators additional time to restore cooling systems. The
most effective heat removal strategy during a station black-
out would be to establish adequate water make up to the
steam generators and ensure that they do not dry out. In the
Enhanced CANDU 6 ~2,040,000 kg of water is available in
the reserve water tank, for prolonged emergencies requiring
heat sinks.
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